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Abstract
We explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and borrow-
ing constraints deter households from the stockmarket, consistent with
the predictions of theoretical studies of portfolio choice in the presence
of uninsurable earnings. Recent extensions highlight the importance
of the correlation between earnings and financial risks. We use a self-
assessed proxy for the correlation from the DELTA-TNS 2002 cross-
sectional survey. While income risk does not deter from the stock-
market those households’ reporting a negative correlation, it does for
those who report a non-negative sign, consistent with economic theory
predictions.
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1 Introduction
The main challenge incorporating background risks is to specify a realistic
model for the joint distribution of these risks with asset returns... Michael
Brandt (2004).
There has been growing interest on the implications of incomplete markets
for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Perhaphs among the most impor-
tant ones are the puzzles identified in the economics and finance literatures
when confronting theoretical predictions with real data (’equity premium’,
’nonparticipation’, ’home bias’...). Recent availability of household-level data
sets is guiding new theoretical developments and shaping the understanding
of older ones, since new puzzles are emerging (Guiso et al. (2002, 2003)).
The classical theory of portfolio choice was developed in a complete mar-
kets framework, meaning that all individual risks could be traded. It identi-
fied, as determinants of households’ demand for stocks, the expected excess
return of stocks over riskless assets, the objective risk of stocks as measured
by its variance, and households subjective perception of that risk as mea-
sured by their risk aversion. The observation that severe informational re-
strictions precluded most households from insuring their labor earnings, and
yet, was their most important source of lifetime income, motivated the re-
consideration of the complete markets assumption. This reconsideration led
to important departures from the predictions of the classical theory. Drèze
and Modigliani (1966, 1972) already observed that an important consequence
of the non-insurability of earnings risks was that portfolio and labor market
decisions become connected. Intertemporal extensions to incorporate non-
tradable and undiversifiable income (Koo (1999), Davis and Willen (2000)
or Viceira (2001) among many others), borrowing and liquidity constraints
(Koo (1999), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)), indivisibilities like housing
(Brueckner (1997), Flavin and Yamashita (2002)), age (Gollier and Zeck-
hauser (1997), Viceira (2001) or Campbell and Viceira (2002)), or informa-
tion and transactions costs (King and Leape (1987), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
or Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)), have also been pervasively studied em-
pirically thanks to the increased availability of household-level data. In this
work we use household-level survey data to examine these theoretical devel-
opments on a sample of French households.
One of the most recent theoretical extensions of the classical portfolio
choice model has formalized the following common wisdom intuition: when
risk averse households are confronted with a risk beyond their control -
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exogenous or ’background’ risk (hereafter)-, they should be willing to de-
crease their exposure to other avoidable risks -endogenous risks- in order
to adjust their desired total risk exposure (Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987),
Kimball (1993), or Gollier and Pratt (1996)). Households observing this
behaviour are called ’temperant’1. Accordingly, and as labor income is unin-
surable, those ’temperant’ households who suffer more from labor market
uncertainty should choose to be less exposed to financial risk, ceteris paribus.
As well, changes in the income risk that increase households exposure to un-
avoidable risks should compel them to crowd out from the stock market2.
Although there is empirical evidence supporting this theoretical prediction
using household-level data (Guiso et al. (1996) for Italy, Massa and Simonov
(2006) for Sweden or Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) for the US), other empirical studies have not been able to confirm it
(Hochguertel (1998) or Alessie et al. (2002) for The Netherlands, Arrondel
and Masson (1996) or Arrondel and Calvo (2002) for France).
More recently, surprising empirical results about the correlation between
earnings and financial risks have been known. Davis and Willen (2000) or
Heaton and Lucas (2000) show that, contrary to educated intuition received
from equilibrium economic models, both risks tend to be independent in
the aggregate and differently correlated depending on the income decompo-
sition criterion chosen. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for the US or Massa and
Simonov (2006) for Sweden, provide empirical evidence on the absence of
a significant impact of the correlation on households’ demand for risky as-
sets using individual longitudinal datasets. Yet, both the standard theory of
portfolio choice and empirical works emphasize the importance of the cor-
relation component, e.g. in addressing the home-bias puzzle (Botazzi et al.
(1996), Palacios-Huerta (2001) or Julliard (2004)). Confronted with such
ambiguity, we follow Dominitz (1998, 2001), Dominitz and Manski (1997)
or Manski (2003) and propose individually self-assessed measures that proxy
both the correlation and earnings uncertainty exploiting French household
survey data (DELTA - TNS 2002). Earnings risk is found to have a negative
impact on households’ decision to hold risky assets provided that we control
for the correlation, in line both with the results obtained for other countries
1Strictly speaking, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show that ’temperance’ is a house-
hold’s preference property characterizing her optimal choices in a class of lotteries (zero-
mean independent lotteries). We are going to use it in a more general sense.
2A synthesis of the empirical studies documenting the rise in labor market uncertainty
for most OECD countries can be found in Katz and Autor (1999).
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and theoretical predictions.
The rest of the work proceeds as follows. In section 2 we summarize the
theoretical assumptions and empirical implications underlying the adverse
impact of correlated undiversifiable earnings on financial risk taking (tem-
perant stockholding behaviour). In section 3, we describe the ’DELTA - TNS
2002’ household survey and assess empirically the theoretical predictions on
households’ decisions to invest in stocks. Section 4 concludes.
2 Temperant Stockholdings with a Correlated
Background Risk
Drèze and Modigliani’s (1966, 1972) pioneering work has lead researchers
to reconsider the classical theory of portfolio choice, originally developed by
Arrow (1965) under the assumption that all individual income risks can be
traded (complete markets). In this section we only consider the theoretical
implications of removing the assumption of complete markets for the stan-
dard static portfolio choice problem3.
Under complete markets, the problem a household faces is how to invest
her current wealth w0 when there are only two assets available: a risky
asset promising to deliver tomorrow a random return r˜ and a riskless asset
promising the delivery of a sure return r. Her individual objective function
is a continuous differentiable representation of his preferences that admit an
expected utility form over final wealth wf . Denoting by α the amount of
initial wealth that is invested in the risky asset, by z˜ ≡ r˜ − r the excess
return of the risky asset over the riskless asset, and by w ≡ w0(1 + r) the
final wealth had she invested all her current wealth w0 in the riskless asset,
we can write the solution α∗ to her individual optimization problem under
the small risk approximation as:
α∗ 
Ez˜
σ2zAu(w)
∈ argmax
α
Eu(w + αz˜) (1)
Where Au(w) ≡ −
u′′(w)
u′(w)
is the standard Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute
risk aversion evaluated at the agents’ wealth w when the agent’s preferences
are represented by utility u(.).
3To consider the effect of liquidity constraints or investor horizons is beyond the scope of
this short section, and is relegated to the discussion of empirical results. A good textbook
treatment is Gollier (2001).
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Now, assume that the household cannot trade her labor income risk y˜
(incomplete markets). Will she invest more in risky asssets? Under the
small risk approximation, optimal stockholdings become:
α̂ 
Ez˜
σ2zAv(w)
∈ argmax
α
Eu(w + αz˜ + y˜) (2)
Where now Av(w) ≡ −
v′′(w)
v′(w)
and v(t) ≡ Eyu(t+ y˜) is the indirect utility func-
tion, as defined by Kihlstrom et al. (1981). Common wisdom would suggest
that increasing household’s exposure to risks beyond her control should lead
her to decrease her optimal exposure to risks under her control, i.e. risks
are substitutes rather than complements. Formally, Pratt and Zeckhauser
(1987), Kimball (1993) or Gollier and Pratt (1996) showed that substitution
between risks means conditions under which the change in preferences from
u(.) to v(.) leads households to be more risk averse in the presence of the
independent background risk on income y˜ :
Av(w) ≥ Au(w) =⇒ α̂ ≤ α
∗ (3)
Using a cross-section of Italian households (SHIW), Guiso et al. (1996)
were the first to provide empirical validity for this comparative statics prop-
erty. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Heaton and Lucas (2000) also find evi-
dence that background risk reduces stock market participation in the United
States, as do Massa and Simonov (2006) for Swedish households. Hochguer-
tel (1998) results for the Netherlands are inconclusive and those of Alessie
et al. (2001) for the same country did not find a significant effect of income
uncertainty on the demand for risky assets. Arrondel and Masson (1996,
2003) or Arrondel and Calvo (2002) obtain a different result for France: as
households are more exposed to earnings risk (proxied by occupation sec-
tors), they tend to own more stocks. Rather than dismissing the theoretical
prediction, a natural assumption to relax is the hypothesis that household
income y˜ and stock market excess returns z˜ are independent.
Specializing to the assumptions4 of Kimball (1993), Arrondel and Calvo
(2002) extend the results of this literature to dependent background risks
4Kimball (1993) shows that condition [3] holds if and only if utility exhibits standard
risk aversion whenever household income risk is loss-aggravating. Utility exhibits standard
risk aversion whenever it displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing
absolute prudence (DAP). A risk y˜ is loss-aggravating when starting from initial wealth
w if and only if Eu′(w+ y˜) ≥ u′(w). Observe that this is equivalent to Ey˜ ≤ Ψ : Ψ is the
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of the form introduced by Elmendorf and Kimball (2000). Following the
latter, define now income risk as y˜c = h˜+βz˜ where subindex ’c’ accounts for
’correlated’, since the parameter β captures a non-zero correlation between
y˜c and z˜. Then, under the small risk approximation the household’s risky
asset demand is given by:
α 
Ez˜
σ2zAv̂(w)
− β ∈ argmax
α
Eu[w + αz˜ + y˜c] (4)
We can then define total stockholdings θ as the sum of two components: a
fixed implicit component given by the correlation β, and a variable explicit
component α directly managed by the household so as to adjust total stock-
holdings to its optimal value θ̂ ≡ α + β  Ez˜
σ2zAv̂(w)
(5). We can then express
the analogue of property (3), that will be the object of empirical scrutiny in
section 3, as6:
Av̂(w) ≥ Au(w) =⇒ α+ β ≡ θ̂ ≤ α
∗ (5)
CRRA Example: Specifying the utility function to be u(w) = w
1−γ
1−γ
:
γ ≡ wAu(w), and assuming that rate of return risk and earnings are jointly
lognormally distributed, the (approximation) technique presented in Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002) yields the following decomposition of the weak in-
equality in the right hand side of (5):
θ̂ − α∗ =
1

(
Ez˜
σ2zγ
− β
)
−
Ez˜
σ2zγ
(6)
=
(
1

−
1
c
)
Ez˜
σ2zγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(-) Risk Substitution Effect
+
(
1
c
− 1
)
Ez˜
σ2zγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+) Income Effect
−
1

β︸︷︷︸ ≤ 0
Hedging Effect:
(+) if β>0; (-) if β<0
(7)
precautionary premium as defined by Kimball (1990). In intuitive terms, they are risks
that make the agent willing to pay a bigger amount than its expected value in order to
keep as optimal the decision prevailing before the risk was introduced. Finally observe
that if preferences are DARA, every undesirable risk is loss-aggravating.
5In a CAPM framework, Davis and Willen (2000) termed them, respectively, by ’en-
dowed’ (Hedging component), ’desired’ (Markowitz component) and ’total’ exposures to
rate of return risk. Here we follow the terminology of Elmendorf and Kimball (2000).
6Because the independent component of the background risk h˜ has a negative impact on
total stockholdings if and only if it is in the loss-aggravating class of risks and households’
preferences are standard (DAP and DARA). Therefore θ̂ ≤ α∗.
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where 1

= 1 +
Ey˜ exp{− 12σ2y}
exp{Er˜+w0}
> 1
c
= 1 + Ey˜
exp{Er˜+w0}
. 1

(
1
c
)
is the inverse
elasticity of total wealth with respect to financial wealth when labour income
is stochactic and (non-stochastic but) non-tradable. When non-stochastic, it
is equal to the expected value of uncertain earnings y˜c.
The equality from (6) to (7) follows from adding and subtracting the
optimal portfolio 1
c
Ez˜
σ2zγ
of a household with certain but nontradable labour
income y = Ey˜c. The first additive term in (7) captures the negative effect
on the complete markets optimal portfolio α∗ of introducing an independent
zero-mean background risk y˜ − y : Ey˜ = Ey˜c (risk-vulnerable reaction, in
Gollier and Pratt’s (1996) terminology). The second term in (7) captures
the positive effect on α∗ of introducing an independent background risk with
positive mean Ey˜ = y > 0, i.e. because preferences display decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion, richer households are more willing to invest in stocks.
The last term in (7) captures the ’hedging effect’ to the extent that we al-
low for correlated earnings y˜c. Notice that it is interacted with the inverse
elasticity 1

, which is itself a function of earnings variance σ2y, because for
those households whose income risk is small, the hedging component will be
negligible7.
Remark 1: (Empirical Implication) Recalling that we observe explicit
asset holdings α and not total asset holdings θ̂, expression (5) shows that any
empirical attempt to validate it requires a measure for the correlation β. For
example, establishing empirically that α∗ ≥ α does not imply that households
invest less in risky assets because they cannot trade their earnings risk (risk
substitution effect). Households may explicitely hold less risky assets just
because they are already implicitely investing in the stock market through
their earnings, i.e. β > 0 (Hedging effect). Conversely, suppose that we
empirically detect that α∗ ≤ α, concluding that the average (e.g. French)
household invests more in risky assets the more exposed she is to earnings
risk. This is only true provided that β = 0. If on average β < 0, it may
actually be the case that θ̂ = α+ β ≤ α∗ in line with what risk substitution
prescribes when income risk is correlated, i.e. (5). (8)
7We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this observation.
8Notice that assuming CARA preferences precludes any impact of introducing a cor-
related background risk beyond the hedging component, because then risk aversion is
independent of wealth, i.e. Av̂(w) = Au(w). This is also the case when mean-variance
preferences are used as long as the income risk is non-tradable, for general joint statistical
distributions of financial and labour returns.
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Remark 2: (Effect on Participation) Arrow (1965) established that un-
der complete markets, if the expected excess return of investing in risky assets
is positive, every risk averse household whose preferences can be represented
by a differentiable felicity function should invest a fraction of her wealth
in risky assets. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) noticed that this theoretical
prediction lacked empirical support using the 1983 US Survey of Consumer
Finances, and called it the stockholding puzzle. Under incomplete markets
however, if income risk is negatively correlated and non-diversifiable, ratio-
nal risk averse households may optimally invest in the risky asset even if
the expected excess return Ez˜ is negative, since it provides partial insurance
against the exogenous earnings risk. And conversely: even if the stock mar-
ket delivers a considerable positive risk premium, households whose incomes
covariate positively with the stock market will optimally choose not to hold
stocks if participation increases their global risk exposure beyond wish9. To
the extent that at the individual level this correlation changes with the ed-
ucational level and sector of activity (Davis and Willen, 2000), professional
status and asset ownership (Heaton and Lucas, 2000), or stockownership sta-
tus (Palacios-Huerta, 2001), this is likely to generate cross sectional variation
in participation.
Remark 3: (Risk aversion as a determinant of the participation equa-
tion) If transaction costs are present (ex. sign-up or brokerage fixed fees),
differences in risk aversion will also determine the decision to participate
if households become less risk averse as their wealth or income increases
(Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Haliassos (2003), Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003)). Further, conditioning on income and wealth, households with riskier
incomes are also less prone to pay the fee for investing in risky assets.
9If we define the value function of the household evaluated at her optimal choice α
as W (α) = Eu(w + αz˜ + y˜c), notice that W
′(α)|
α=0
≥ 0 and thus α ≥ 0 whenever
cov[z˜, u′] > 0 even if Ez˜ < 0 (negative risk premium):
sign W ′(α)|
α=0
= sign{Ez˜ +
cov[z˜, u′]
Eu′
} > 0
Since u′′(.) < 0, the term cov[z˜, u′] > 0 is equivalent to cov[z˜, y˜c] < 0 by Gollier’s (2001)
proposition 15. And conversely.
8
3 Empirical evidence
Guiso et al. (1996) provided empirical support to the adverse impact of
unavoidable income risk and anticipated liquidity constraints on household
stockholding decisions using Italian data10. Using their same specification
and similarly constructed relevant variables, we confirm their findings on
French household data if we control for the correlation between earnings and
financial returns. When we exclude the correlation variable, income risk has
no effect on the decision to invest in risky assets, at odds with theoretical
predictions.
3.1 Data description and risk variables
We rely on the ’Mode de vie et épargne’ household survey conducted by
DELTA and Taylor Nelson-Sofres in 2002 (DELTA - TNS 2002) on a sam-
ple of 4000 French households with individuals between 35 and 55 years
old, representative of the French population in the age bracket. Only 2518
households answered, of which 2460 could be exploited. This survey contains
information on earnings, income, wealth, socio-economic status and demo-
graphic characteristics of the household. Questions that capture the degree
of individual exposure and aversion to risk include those proposed by Barsky
et al. (1997), based on relative risk-aversion to lotteries on lifetime labour
income, and by Guiso and Paiella (2001, 2004), based on the degree of ab-
solute risk-aversion to financial lotteries11. Finally, a question to proxy for
the correlation between earnings and financial risk as subjectively perceived
by individuals is for the first time available.
The DELTA-TNS 2002 survey contains qualitative information on the dis-
tribution of household financial assets in ten categories: cash, transactions
and savings accounts, homeownership savings accounts, bonds (Treasury
bills, certificates, fixed-rate long term bonds and other government paper),
stocks from privatized public companies, private companies listed stocks,
stocks of foreign firms, mutual funds and managed investment accounts, an-
nuities, life insurance contracts and contributions to complementary pension
plans. Table 1 reports the proportion of households holding each asset.
(Table 1 here)
10Empirical evidence for other European countries using a homogeneous methodology
are collected in Guiso et al. (2003).
11See the appendix for details concerning both.
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We define direct stockholdings as the sum of stocks of privatised public
companies, private companies listed stocks and stocks of foreign firms held,
and as indirect stockholdings, those held through mutual funds and managed
investment accounts. Although in some countries bonds have a considerable
risk of default justifying their inclusion in the risky asset holdings (i.e. Guiso
et al., 1996), this is not the case of France and we therefore exclude them.
As well, we exclude homeownership from the risky asset category despite
of being highly illiquid and indivisible (and therefore risky), because French
households mostly buy houses for the flow of services it provides rather than
as a financial investment (Arrondel, 1996). Still, in the estimation we control
for the level of total net worth (real plus financial) and include a dummy
variable that takes value one when houseownership status is observed. The
proportion of households who hold stocks directly is 21%, and 33% either
directly or indirectly. Although low, the participation rates are similar to
those obtained from previous INSEE surveys12 and to the figures from other
European countries studied in Guiso et al. (2003) (13). The extent to which
such low participation rates in financial risk are explained by both earnings
risk and the expectation of being liquidity constrained is subject to empirical
scrutiny.
Available data to capture earnings uncertainty is scarce, as we show be-
low. Therefore we construct a proxy for the subjective income variance as
follows: we estimate it conditional on a vector of characteristics from the
wealth INSEE survey ’Patrimoine 98’, and predict earnings uncertainty for
DELTA-TNS 2002 households. Since each labor income recipient in 1998
was asked to attribute probability weights to given intervals of real income
increases five years ahead, we can match 1998 and 2002 data14. In the Appen-
12The figures are comparable with those of the ’Patrimoine 1998’ household survey con-
ducted by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). For
the 35-55 year-olds corresponding subsample, the proportion of households holding risky
assets ’directly’ is 21.6 and either directly or through mutual funds, 32.4. Arrondel and
Masson (2003) provide a thorough description of household portfolios using the ’Patri-
moine 98’ INSEE household survey.
13The increased participation relative to previous studies using French data is due to
the restricted age bracket sampled (i.e. between 35 and 55 year-old individuals are more
likely to participate), and not to a real increase in participation as shown in Arrondel
(2003).
14Assuming that five years ahead expected real income is yt+5 = yt(1 + x¯), then the
formula of the expected variance of household income is var(yt+5) ≡ σ
2
y = σ
2
xy
2
t , where yt
is current real income, x¯ is the expected growth rate of real income and σ2x its variance.
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dix it can be seen that the structual parameters can be reasonably thought as
stable15, given that most of the determinants evolve slowly over the relevant
time span (e.g., risk preferences, occupational and personal status, region
of residence or having had health problems in the past). This procedure
facilitates the comparison with previous results (Guiso et al., 1996) as well
as to partially overcome the potential endogeneity problem of this measure,
i.e. that more risk averse households hold both safer occupations and tend
to participate less in the stock market (Lusardi, 1997). Criticisms to the use
of this self-assessed measure of income risk are well-known: it is a sufficient
indicator of risk for a very restrictive class of preferences, potentially under-
estimates the probability of very low income events and it is too low when
compared to panel data estimates16.
(Table 2 here)
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample (columns 1 and 2),
by the sign of self-assessed correlations (columns 3 and 4, for non-negative
and negative correlations respectively) and for varying levels of earnings un-
certainty (columns 5 and 6, for low and high levels respectively). The sample
average of the predicted income risk is 6.3%, strikingly low when compared
with the values from the precautionary savings literature, i.e. between 10%
and 20% of the earnings’ level (e.g. Deaton (1992) reports a standard error
of 15% for next year expected earnings in the US), but of the same order of
magnitude as in Guiso et al. (1992, 1996). A decomposition of the sample
by varying levels of income uncertainty below and above the median of the
predicted distribution (table 2, columns 5 and 6) confirms that households
with higher uncertainty hold marginally less risky assets (Arrondel and Calvo
(2002), Arrondel and Masson (2003)), are younger, financially poorer, earn
less at work, have more irregular incomes (discrete income risk variable), are
more often unemployed, are more risk averse (see below) and more often
women, hold lower educational degrees but are better informed (as proxied
by parents holding risky assets, and having access to internet), and are more
often liquidity constrained than households in the low income risk group.
As suggested by the theory, a test of the proposition that undiversifiable
earnings crowds households out of the stockmarket requires controlling for
15We also need that the expectation of earnings uncertainty is positively correlated
with current income uncertainty. An ordered probit confirms that both variables are
significantly positively correlated.
16See Guiso et al. (1992, 1996) for further details, and Dominitz (1998, 2001) for a
reassessment of those criticisms.
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its potential covariation with financial returns, as well as for all variables
that determine the decision to invest in the stock market. To control for
the correlation, a question in the survey asks households about the reasons
that may lead big firms to downsize the labour force: a binding bankruptcy
constraint (a positive correlation is assumed, ρ > 0) or the expectation of
a positive price impact on the firm’s listed stocks (a negative correlation is
attributed, ρ < 0). From table 2, 62% report a negative correlation, while
34% reports a positive one. The remaining 4% are non-respondents. The de-
scriptive statistics in table 2 by the reported sign of the correlation, columns
3 and 4, show that households who assessed a negative correlation participate
more often in the stock market (as predicted by the theory), are more risk
averse (see below), work more often in a big firm and are considerably more
educated17. This last point seems to be at odds with the current consensus
that earnings of college educated household heads covariate positively with
financial returns (Haliassos (2003), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)), and if
accepted, would relegate our variable to an informational proxy status. But
Palacios-Huerta (2001, 2003) notices that standard panel data computations
of the correlation have neglected the skill premium component of earnings.
Since this skill premium is negatively correlated with the returns to domestic
capital18, taking it into account reverses the positive correlations obtained
by Campbell (1996) for stockholders (see table 1 in Palacios-Huerta, 2001).
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006) also provide evidence of a robust neg-
ative correlation between human capital and financial returns in the US19.
17Unreported probit estimations confirm that those who have graduate studies (+14%)
and college education (+11.9%) and work in a big firm (+6.2%) tend to report a negative
correlation assessment.
18Rubinstein and Tsiddon (2001) use the 1968-1992 PSID data on white males to show
that higher educational attainments correspond to less cyclical unemployment, employ-
ment and wages. Furthermore, controlling for parents’ educational levels, college gradu-
ates with educated parents face acyclical unemployment and wage increases in absolute
terms during recessions, while the less educated with less educated parents face highly
pro-cyclical wages and employment. See also Keane et al. (1988) for additional evidence
along these lines.
19Botazzi et al. (1996) use OECD data for 16 countries from 1970 to 1992, and find
significant negative covariation between innovations to human wealth and innovations
to financial wealth, for all but 4 countries (Austria, Germany, Norway and US) includ-
ing France (see tables 3, 4 and 5). This finding has been subsequently corroborated by
Palacios-Huerta (2001), Julliard (2004, tables 1, 2 and 4) and more recently, by Santos
and Veronesi (2005, tables 1, 2A, 2B, 3 and 4). Cocco et al. (2005) perform a Carroll
and Samwick’s (1997) labour income variance decomposition by educational levels on PSID
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Contrary to most of the existing studies, two different questions that
proxy households’ degree of risk aversion are available. The first mimics
the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997) (see Appendix) and assumes that
housholds risk preferences are in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
class: 8% of the sample has a CRRA coefficient lower than 1, 20% has a
CRRA between 1 and 2, 28% has a CRRA between 2 and 3.76 and 37%
has a risk aversion coefficient greater than 3.76 (20). The second is based
on work by Guiso and Paiella (2001, 2004), who construct a measure of the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion21. It asks individuals their maximum
willingness to pay to enter a lottery representing a relatively large financial
risk (around 16% of average annual income)22. We use the first to obtain
estimates of the subjective income variance (because it was the only vari-
able available in the ’Patrimoine 98’ survey) and the second to estimate the
probability of participation, since this variable has more explanatory power
and it is continuous. More importantly, accounting for risk aversion signif-
icantly contributes to avoid endogeneity issues between occupational choice
and financial risk taking attitudes23.
Finally, to capture households’ ability to gain access to credit markets,
two questions in the survey identify both ’discouraging borrowers’ and ’turned
down applicants’. The variable that proxies for liquidity constraints takes
value one if households qualified themselves in either category, and is similar
to the one used by Guiso et al. (1996). 481 of the 2460 surveyed households
data, to find statistically non significant negative correlation for both college educated and
high school dropouts, while zero for high school attendants (see table 3 in their paper).
20The proportion of households in each CRRA coefficient bracket for the 35-55 year old
subsample in the INSEE survey ’Patrimoine 98’ (column 3, table A1 in appendix) are
similar to those for the DELTA-TNS 2002 survey (column 2, table A1 in appendix).
21For sampled households, both measures are positively correlated though less than
expected. The reason seems to stem in the different type of lotteries they propose to
survey respondents: the first relates to lifetime labour income prospects, while the second
proposes a financial investment opportunity. Arrondel et al. (2002) consider ’domain
dependent’ risk averse preferences.
22A potential drawback of this measure is that the magnitude of the risk is too large for a
second order Taylor approximation to be accurate (it is claimed to be valid for small risks,
i.e. between 1% and 5% of average income). This is to be traded-off against the inaccuracy
of responses if the lottery is small, since expected utility maximizers are risk-neutral in
the small (Rabin, 2000). Still, it is likely to be a poor measure for poorer individuals.
23In table 2, comparing columns 5 and 6 along the rows reporting the two risk aversion
measures, those who are more risk averse perceive riskier incomes (see also Guiso and
Paiella, 2004).
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are liquidity constrained (20%) (24). Households exposed to higher earnings
risk (by both the discrete and predicted income risk proxies) are also more
likely to be liquidity constrained, in line with theoretical predictions25.
3.2 Empirical results
For estimation purposes, we assume that households’ indirect utility function
can be written as a linear function of household i observable characteristics
xi, plus an error term ei normally distributed. The error term includes
household-specific factors affecting her utility. Let Usi = β
′
sxi + e
s
i be the
indirect utility function of stockholders, and U0i = β
′
0xi + e
0
i that of non-
stockholders (s = 0). Since the indirect utility function cannot be observed,
only participation status, we accordingly define the dichotomous variable yi
that takes value 1 if the household participates, and 0 otherwise:
Pr(yi = 1|xi) = Pr(U
s
i − U
0
i > 0) = Pr(β
′
xi + ei > 0|xi) = Φ(β
′
xi) (8)
where Φ(.) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The vector xi contains a proxy for anticipated liquidity constraints (cli), the
expected variance of earnings (σ2i,y), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(γi), the proxy of the subjectively assessed correlation (ρi) and its interaction
with income risk (see above), and a vector wi of other variables previously
demonstrated to be significant in explaining positive stockholdings such as
age, gender, labour income, financial wealth, homeownership status, inter
vivos or mortis causa transfers, and a set of variables that proxies for the
stock of financial information (living in Paris, parents stockownership status
and having acces to internet) (26). Since demographic factors give also an
approximation of potential future sources of income risk the exclusion of
which can lead to misspecification problems (Burgess et al., 2000), we include
a dummy that takes value 1 if the household has children. Finally, to control
24Although the percentage seems strikingly high, it is not among the 35-55 year-old
households when compared with the INSEE ’Patrimoine 1998’ survey (13.25%) or with
the figure reported by Guiso et al. (1996) for the 1987 SHIW (15.6%).
25Since those who are more likely to be liquidity constrained are also more likely to
face higher income uncertainty, we control for potential endogneity problems (see next
subsection).
26Arrondel and Masson (1990, 1996, 2003) show that although fixed transactions and
information costs are the main determinants of stockownership, they do not explain the
amount of stocks held.
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for inertial factors (mainly incentive remuneration schemes) that may explain
involuntary stockmarket paricipation, we also introduce the variable ’working
in a big firm’. In specification (8), income risk is assumed to be exogenous.
If capital markets are imperfect (transaction or informational costs) house-
holds’ income and wealth influences portfolio choice27. The empirical analysis
reveals that their effect is best captured by a second order polynomial. Al-
though this facilitates the comparison with existing results in the literature
(Guiso et al. (1996, 2002, 2003), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) or King and
Leape (1998)), it has the disadvantage of introducing heteroscedasticity in
the error term ei :
V ar(ei|xi, zi) = [exp (υ
′zi)]
2
: zi ≡ Financial wealth
Table 3 reports the regression results of the heteroscedastic probit esti-
mation28 by measures of income risk29. The variables have the expected signs
with minor differences across columns. Financial wealth has a positive effect
on participation and is significant at the 1% level. An increase in financial
wealth from the first decile (6,500 euros) to the ninth decile (410,000 euros)
increases the probability of participation by 25%. Income also increases the
probability of participation in the stock market, moving from the first to the
ninth decile increases the probability of stockownership by 7%. The effects
are consistent with fixed transaction and information costs of accessing the
stock market, as well as of decreasing aversion to financial risk taking, since
both capture households’ initial endowments other than housing. Homeown-
ership status has a positive and significant effect, increasing the probability
of participation by 7%. Heaton and Lucas (2000) rationalize this finding
by means of the negative correlation detected between housing and financial
risks, i.e. owning a house serves as a hedge against financial fluctuations30
27See King and Leape (1987, 1998) and simulated results by Cocco et al. (2005) or
Haliassos and Michaelides (2003).
28The Likelihhood Ratio test (LR) is distributed as a χ2(1) and for each different mea-
sure of income risk considered, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the estimated coefficients have the same sign and are
similar in magnitude.
29Results in Table 3 only refer to direct and indirect stockownership. But the sign
and magnitude of the reported estimates are robust to changes in the definition of stock-
ownership (only direct stockholders) and occupational status (subsample of only active
households). They are also robust to a semi-log specification in income and financial
wealth.
30A potential endogeneity bias may also explain the positive effect, if we consider the
15
(see also Brueckner (1997) or Flavin and Yamashita (2002)). But it can also
be interpreted as a proxy for total wealth if trasaction costs are present, so
that homeowners are less risk averse because they are wealthier.
(Table 3 here)
Previous empirical studies find that education increases the probability of
participation. We excluded it because of its strong correlation with income
and the set of information variables. More information significantly increases
the probability of participation: Having Internet at home31 raises the proba-
bility of participation by 11% and if parents hold risky assets, the probability
increases to 16% (32). Households living in Paris are 13% more likely to hold
risky assets. The age variables indicate that the probability of owning risky
assets is lower for younger households, although it has a hump-shaped effect
reaching its maximum at the age of 46. Younger individuals are less informed
(King and Leape, 1987) tend to be more often liquidity constrained (Cocco
et al. (2005), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Viceira (2001)) and have a
stronger preference for homeownership (Flavin and Yamashita (2002)) but
enjoy greater labour supply flexibility (Bodie et al. (1992), Chan and Viceira
(2000)). But the reduction in the probability of stockownership after 46 is
difficult to explain by life cycle motives alone33.
In accordance with theoretical predictions, more risk averse individuals
have a lower probability of participation34. Surprisingly, once we control for
risk aversion, being a woman significantly reduces the probability of being
a stockholder (by a 8%), confirming the results obtained by Schubert et al.
(1999). Households with children are 3% less likely to invest in the stock
market. Having received an inheritance or inter vivos transfers increases the
probability of participation (6% and 3% respectively), but the latter is only
choice of the house. However, this is rather unlikely given the illiquid nature of the asset
in France, and that most households do not buy it for investment purposes.
31The positive effect of information on the probability of holding stocks, as proxied by
having internet access has recently been documented by Bogan (2006) for the US.
32Chiteji and Stafford (2000) or Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) obtain similar results: when
parents are stockholders, children have a higher probability of becoming stockholders
because informational barriers are smaller.
33The age coefficients are difficult to interpret also because only individuals between 35
and 55 were interviewed.
34We have tested the two available variables that capture risk aversion. We have chosen
the continuous variable based on Guiso and Paiella (2001, 2004) because it has more
explanatory power, its wording is closely related to financial risk taking and the CRRA
variable is used as a predictor in the income risk estimation.
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significant at 10%.
Households who have been liquidity constrained or who think that they
will be so in the future are less likely to participate (around 13%). The effect
of liquidity constraints reinforces the risk substitution effect, in line with the
empirical results obtained by Guiso et al. (1996) and with theoretical pre-
dictions. Gollier (2001) proves that the willigness to take risk is reduced in
the presence of a liquidity constraint if absolute risk tolerance is increasing
and convex in wealth. Koo’s (1999) theorem 2 (iii) states that liquidity con-
strained households invest strictly less in risky assets than households who
are not constrained, because their risk tolerance is smaller. Deaton (1992)
explains how the expectation of being liquidity constrained in the future
leads prudent households to save more (’buffer stock’), while Elmendorf and
Kimball (2000) prove that the positive wealth effect of increased precaution-
ary savings that leads decreasing risk averse (DARA) households to invest
more in stocks is dominated by the negative increase in risk if households
are also decreasingly prudent (DAP), resulting in an overall reduction in
stockownership.
To avoid a possible endogeneity bias of the liquidity dummy, we con-
ducted Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) test. The instruments used in the
auxiliary IV regression are: squared log of income, education, marital status,
health status, a dummy variable for those individuals who have asked for a
credit and labour status. We also tested the validity of the instruments, and
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the regressors cannot be rejected35.
The available correlation proxy is an imperfect assessment of individual
earnings’ degree of covariation with rate of return risk. Still it has the ad-
vantage of being self-assessed, and behaves empirically in accordance with
the theoretical predictions: households who assess a negative sign, ρ < 0, are
9 percentage points more likely to participate (at 1% level of significance,
in both columns 1 and 2, table 3). A possible interpretation comes from
Botazzi et al. (1996) or Danthine and Donaldson (2002): a negative average
correlation indicates that redistributive shocks dominate over the cycle. In
accordance with this observation, individuals reporting a negative correla-
tion answered that ’big firms fire employees because they want to increase
the price of their stockmarket shares’. A probit regression of the probability
35Instruments appear individually and jointly significant, with a χ2(11) statistic of 33.41
and a P-value of 0.005. See also Robin (2000) for further details. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
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to assess a negative sign confirms ’working in a big firm’ and having received
college education or above as the two main determinants. Another possible
interpretation in terms of the skill premium content of wages rationalizes the
second main determinant: educated individuals tend to have counter-cyclical
labour earnings (Rubinstein and Tsiddon, 2001), and therefore have a higher
propensity to become stockowners because the returns to human capital are
negatively correlated with the stock market (Palacios-Huerta, 2001) (36).
The skill premium interpretation is consistent with the descriptive evidence
in the bottom row of table 2: college educated households (last two rows)
tend to report a negative sign (columns 3 and 4) and have lower income risk
(columns 5 and 6), while less than college educated ones (rows three to five
from the bottom) tend to report a non-negative sign (columns 3 and 4) and
have higher income risk (columns 5 and 6). While other recent studies have
not been able to find evidence of a correlation effect using longitudinal indi-
vidual data (e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) or Massa and Simonov (2006)),
none of them has considered the potential skill premium content of wages
that is consistent with our self-assessed correlation proxy.
Column 1 reports the estimation results using the discrete income risk
dummy. A one is assigned to those who report either irregular or a mix of
regular and irregular household earnings, while a zero is attributed otherwise.
Contrary to available empirical evidence for the US (Vissig-Jorgensen (2002),
Campbell and Viceira (2002)), Italy (Guiso et al., 1996) or Sweden (Massa
and Simonov, 2006) and economic theory predictions, it has no significant ef-
fect37. The absence of a negative effect is confirmed by the results in column
2, where the predicted measure of the subjective earnings variance substi-
tutes the discrete income risk variable, to take into account heterogeneity in
earnings risk exposure38.
36Yet a third interpretation in terms of the informational content of unemployment news
on equity returns is possible: bad unemployment news are interpreted as "good news"
during expansions, but as bad news during recessions (Boyd et al. (2005), Andersen et
al. (2005)). But the underlying idea is the one of redistributive shocks, just that they are
state-contingent.
37But in line with previous empirical results for France (Arrondel and Calvo (2002) or
Arrondel and Masson (2003)) and Alessie and Hochguertel (2003) for The Netherlands.
38Although the variance is a partial representation of risk, we considered alternative
measures like the probability of being unemployed five years ahead, a dummy for house-
holds that assign point estimates to reductions in real earnings, and different dispersion
measures of the subjectively assessed individual distributions. For none of them a coeffi-
cient significantly different from zero was obtained.
18
Finally, in column 3 we decompose the effect of expected income risk
using the self-assessed correlation proxy to separate those who assess a neg-
ative sign (ρ < 0) from the rest (ρ ≥ 0). Since the correlation is likely to be
more important for those households who face higher earnings uncertainty,
we introduce the interaction of both. In line with the theoretical results of
section 2, for those households whose earnings are negatively correlated the
effect on participation is ambiguous: they tend to participate less to the
extent that their labour income is risky, but tend to participate more to
the extent that it is negatively correlated and can use the stock market as
a hedge against fluctuations in their earnings. Consistently, a positive but
insignificant coefficient (at 10%) is obtained empirically. As well, for those
who assess a non-negative correlation, from section 2 we know that both
the income risk and the correlation effect go in the same direction. Over-
all a negative impact on participation is obtained (significant at 5%): The
point estimate implies that households reporting a non-negative correlation
are 4.45 percentage points less likely to hold risky assets than households
reporting a negative sign. For those households who assess a non-negative
sign, moving a household from the 10th percentile of relative income risk to
the 90th percentile, decreases the probability of holding assets by 4.3 percent-
age points, all other things being equal. Therefore when controlling for the
correlation, we do find evidence of a negative impact of uninsurable earnings
risk on stockownership.
4 Conclusion
There has been a resurgent interest on the implications of incomplete mar-
kets for portfolio choice theory motivated by the number of portfolio puzzles
identified in the literature. One of the most active research areas has concen-
trated on the study of the determinants of stock market participation and
stockholdings. Considerable progress has been made in understanding the
interactions between income risk, rate of return risk, borrowing constraints
and transactions costs. Using measures proxying for income risk and liquidity
constraints available in the literature, we test whether they affect the stock-
ownership decision controlling for the correlation between earnings and rate
of return risk as self-assessed by households. Exploiting the ’DELTA-TNS
2002’ household survey, the empirical results confirm the theoretical predic-
tion that non-negatively correlated background risks reduce the willingness
19
to bear financial risk, crowding households out from the stock market. As
well, we do find evidence that borrowing and liquidity constraints reduce
households’ propensity to invest in risky assets.
Quantitatively, the effects identified confirm the relative importance of
the different factors as obtained in the literature: transactions costs and
informational barriers, liquidity constraints, taste for risk parameters and
income risk. Each of them is, by decreasing order of magnitude, important
to explain households’ decisions to enter the stock market.
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Appendix
Financial wealth: in the survey the individual is asked to say in which of
the 8 predefined available brackets is her family. Since we are interested in a
continuous measure we have used the simulated residual method (Gouriéroux
et al., 1987). We have regressed an ordered probit of the financial wealth on
some household characteristics. Once we have the estimated financial wealth
a normally distributed error is added. After that, we check if the value falls
inside the bracket chosen by the individual. If not, another normal error is
added and so on until we predict the true interval. Doing so allows us to
overcome the non-response problem for some households. If there is a missing
value, the predicted value plus a normal error is directly used. The financial
wealth is given in francs.
Income: for the income of the household the survey has a discrete vari-
able of 13 brackets. The procedure described in the last paragraph to trans-
form it into a continuous variable has been used too. Income refers to the
household’s annual income in French francs.
Income risk: Since the new survey has no information about different
levels of income risk39, we use information from the ’Patrimoine 98’ survey
to discover the determinants of expected income risk. In the ’Patrimoine
98’ survey a proxy for the subjective variance of households’ income was
constructed, following the methodology carried out by the Bank of Italy in
’SHIW 1989’. It asks households to distribute 100 points between different
scenarios regarding the evolution of income in the next five years (see Guiso et
al., (1992,1996) or Arrondel and Calvo (2002)). We then use the estimated
coefficients to predict each household’s income risk, in our ’DELTA-TNS
2002’ sample. Table A1 reports the estimation results.
(Table A1 here)
The estimates indicate that high income risk households earn more at
work, are younger, more risk averse, have a preference for risk in financial
investments, are more often unemployed, have/had health problems, tend
to co-habitate rather than marry, and have children. There are 8 regional
dummies to control for labour supply differences across regions, and 8 occu-
39There is just a qualitative question about income risk which, in tables 2 and 3, is la-
belled ’discrete income risk’. It is a dummy variable constructed from the survey question.
The survey asks if the household perceives a regular income, an irregular one, or a mix of
both. The dummy variable takes value 1 if the household either answers ’irregular’ or ’a
mix of both’.
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pational dummies to capture heterogeneity in professional tastes.
Table A1 also reports sample means of the variables used to impute in-
come risk. The ’Patrimoine 98 (ages 35-55)’ and ’DELTA-TNS 2002’ vari-
ables can be directly compared, showing similar characteristics. The main
differences are: a lower proportion of surveyed households with children and
graduate studies, and a higher fraction of risk averters and a positive taste
for financial risk taking, relative to the ’Patrimoine 98 (ages 35-55)’ mean
variables. This increased preference for stockholding might be explained by
the dotcom driven stock market boom that took place between 1998 and
2002, in most OECD economies.
Measuring Relative Risk Aversion
To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we asked individuals about their
willingness to gamble on lifetime income (see the Appendix) according to
the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997). The ”game” resides in determining
sequentially whether the interviewee would accept to give up his present
income and to accept other contracts, in the form of lotteries: he has one
chance in two to double his income, and one chance in two for it to be
reduced by one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), and by one fifth
(contract C). More precisely, the question in the survey was: ’Suppose that
you have a job which guarantees for life your household’s current income R.
Other companies offer you various contracts which have one chance out of
two (50%) to provide you with a higher income and one chance out of two
(50%) to provide you with a lower income.
Are you prepared to accept Contract A which has 50% chances to double
your income R and 50% chances that your income will be reduced by one
third?
For those who answer YES : the Contract A is no longer available. You
are offered Contract B instead which has 50% chances to double your income
R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by one half. Are you prepared to
accept?
For those who answer NO : you have refused Contract A. You are of-
fered Contract C. which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50%
chances that it will be reduced by 20%. Are you prepared to accept?’
This allows us to obtain a range measure of relative risk aversion under
the assumption that preferences are strictly risk averse and utility is of the
CRRA type. The degree of relative risk aversion is less than 1 if the individual
successively accepts contracts A and B; between 1 and 2 if he accepts A but
refuses B; between 2 and 3.76 if he refuses A but accepts C; and finally more
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than 3.76 if he refuses both A and C. Among the 2460 households, 172 did
not answer, 886 displayed a relative risk aversion lower than 1, 689 between 1
and 2, 517 between 2 and 3.76, and for 195 households relative risk aversion
was larger than 3.76.
Absolute risk aversion: the survey asks the following: ’if someone
proposes you to invest in a place where you have one chance out of two to win
5000 euros and one chance out of two of losing the capital invested. Howmuch
(as a maximum) will you invest?’. Guiso and Paiella (2001, 2004) show that
absolute risk aversion can be computed as: Ai(wi) = 2
5000− Zi
50002 + Z2i
, where Ai
is the absolute risk aversion and Zi is the amount that the individual declares
to be willing to invest. Risk-averse are those who declare Zi < 5000, risk-
neutral if Zi = 5000, and risk-lovers when Zi > 5000. For details concerning
the validity of the approximation, we address the reader to their work.
(Table A2 here)
To estimate how risk aversion varies with consumers attributes, we have
regressed the measure of absolute risk aversion on observable characteristics
that can proxy for differences in tastes40. In line with their results, table 2
shows that risk aversion decreases with households’ financial wealth. This
provides further support to temperant risk behaviour, that requires decreas-
ing absolute risk averse houshold preferences. Contrary to the results of
Guiso and Paiella (2001) for Italy, no significant differences between living
in different regions41 or having different ages are obtained. Instead, we find
that absolute risk aversion depends on gender, having children and level of
education. Being a woman42 and having children increases risk aversion as
well as being poorly educated. Surprisingly, the fact that the individual has
been unemployed in the past or is likely to be so in the future43 has no effect
on risk aversion. Since residuals are far from being normally distributed,
bootstrapped standard errors are provided in table A2.
Liquidity constraints: Households are asked two questions aimed at
40The results included in table A2 replicate the one developed by Guiso and Paiella
(2001) with the exception of father’s characteristics, information which is not available in
our survey.
41In table 3 we use a dummy for living in Paris which is not statistically significant.
But we also included a dummy variable for each ’département’ and they were not jointly
significant (results reported upon request).
42Schubert et al. (1999) find empirical evidence of women being more risk averse.
43We do not include in the results of table 2 both unemployment variables because the
two are highly correlated and multicollinearity problems emerge.
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measuring their ability to get access to the credit market. These questions
are similar to those of the SHIW Italian survey (Guiso et al. 1996). We
classify consumers as being liquidity constrained if they respond positively
to at least one of the two following questions. The first indicates whether a
consumer is a ”discouraging borrower”, the second whether he is a ”turned
down applicant”:
- Did you renounce to finance expenditures on durable goods (main res-
idence, cars ...) or did you renounce to restore your home because you ex-
pected that bank or other financial intermediaries will refuse the loan or the
mortgage?
- Did you renounce to finance expenditures on durable goods (main res-
idence, cars ...) or did you renounce to restore your home because bank or
other financial intermediaries refused the loan or the mortgage?
In our ’DELTA-TNS 2002’ survey, 481 households are liquidity constrained
(20% of the sample), slightly above the average proportion reported by sim-
ilar studies. The reason is that we only sample households whose head is
between 35 and 55 years old (Arrondel, 2003).
Correlation between stock prices and income risk: there is a ques-
tion in the survey that asks directly to individuals: ’In your opinion, big
firms fire employees when’ and the options are: ’when the firm is in financial
trouble’ or ’when the firm wants to increase its stock market price’. If the
individual responds, ’when the firm is in financial trouble’, a positive cor-
relation is assumed between the exogenous income risk and the endogenous
stock market risk (ρ > 0); the correlation is negative (ρ < 0) if the individ-
ual answers ’when the firm wants to increase its stock market price’ and we
assume that there is no correlation (ρ = 0) when there is no answer.
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Table 1: ‘DELTA-TNS 2002’ Households’ Financial Assets (1) 
Financial assets 
Percentage Holding the Asset 
(TNS 2002) 
(1) 
  
Cash, transactions and savings accounts 84.6 
Homeownership savings (and current) accounts 61.1 
Bonds 4.6 
Stocks from privatized public companies 20.8 
Other stocks 17.6 
Stocks of foreign firms 4.3 
Mutual funds and managed investment accounts 12.0 
Life insurance contracts 46.9 
Annuities  17.6 
Contributions to Complementary Pension Plans 20.8 
 
 
Stockholdings:  
-Direct (2)  21.0 
-Direct and Indirect (3) 33.0 
  
Source: ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’.  
(1) The sample only includes households whose head is between 35 and 55 years old. 
(2) Direct: the household holds stocks of privatised, foreign or other firms publicly listed. 
(3) Direct and Indirect: the household holds equities directly (includes national and  
foreign stocks) and indirectly (through mutual funds). 
 
 34 
Table 2: Sample characteristics ‘DELTA – TNS 2002’(1) 
  
Whole sample 
 
Non-Neg. 
corr. 
(ρ≥0) 
Neg. corr. 
(ρ<0) 
Low-
income 
risk (8) 
High-
income 
risk (8) 
 Mean  Std. Dev.     
Continuous variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Financial wealth (2) (3) 169,409 1,111,641 220,190 137,804 198,642 140,177 
Income (2) (4) 202,067 256,637 204,419 200,605 234,016 170,120 
Income risk (2) (5) 11,920 12,127 11,949 11,901 11,056 12,783 
Age (6) 45 7 45 45 49 41 
Absolute risk aversion (105)(2) 29 14 27 31 29 30 
   
  
  
Discrete variables % of the sample      
Risky Asset Holdings (7) 33%  27% 38% 34% 33% 
Inheritance  19%  19% 20% 22% 17% 
Inter vivos transfers and gifts 
received 52%  52% 52% 50% 54% 
Paris 16%  16% 16% 14% 17% 
Parents own risky assets 24%  22% 25% 22% 26% 
Internet 33%  31% 34% 31% 35% 
Women 15%  15% 15% 17% 14% 
Homeownership 67%  67% 67% 73% 61% 
Child (if n° of children > 0) 44%  47% 43% 23% 65% 
Liquidity constraints (2) 20%  20% 20% 15% 24% 
She has been unemployed 52%  52% 52% 43% 62% 
Working in a big firm 16%  14% 17% 16% 17% 
Relative risk aversion (CRRA):       
Non respondents 7%  8% 7% 12% 2% 
CRRA < 1 8%  22% 20% 11% 4% 
1 ≤ CRRA < 2 20%  24% 30% 21% 19% 
2 ≤ CRRA < 3.76 28%  37% 37% 19% 37% 
CRRA ≥ 3.76 37%  10% 6% 36% 38% 
Correlation between income 
risk and stock market risk: (2)       
ρ > 0 (non-positive correlation) 34%    32% 35% 
ρ < 0 (negative correlation) 62%    61% 62% 
Non-respondents 4%    6% 3% 
Discrete income risk variable       
Non-irregular income 77%  74% 78% 79% 74% 
Irregular income 20%  20% 20% 16% 23% 
Non-respondents 4%  7% 2% 5% 3% 
Education of the head of the 
household:       
No diploma or primary level 6%  7% 5% 3% 9% 
Primary or secondary level 41%  45% 39% 43% 40% 
Baccalaureate 21%  19% 21% 19% 22% 
Graduate studies 25%  22% 27% 27% 23% 
Post-graduate studies 7%  7% 7% 8% 6% 
  
            
Number of households 2,406   923 1,483 1,203 1,203 
Source: ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’. Absolute risk aversion takes value 0 for risk neutrals and 40 for the most risk averse. 
(1) The 54 households who are risk lovers (with negative absolute risk aversion) are dropped off the sample. 
(2) See the appendix for further details about the construction of the variables. 
(3) Financial wealth: household’s total financial wealth in French francs. 
(4) Income: household’s annual income in French francs. 
(5) Income risk: standard deviation of expected income per unit of income estimated from “Patrimoine 98” using 
household characteristics of ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’. Income is in French francs. 
(6) Age: age of the head of the household. 
(7) Risky asset holdings: the household holds equities either directly (includes national and foreign stocks) or 
indirectly (through mutual funds). 
(8) Low-income risk and High-income risk households are those, respectively, below and above the median of the 
distribution of relative income risk (σ²/y). 
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Table 3: Heteroscedastic Probit Estimation  
Direct and Indirect Risky Asset 
Holdings (1) 
Discrete 
Income Risk 
Instrumented 
Income Risk 
Interacting 
Instrumented 
Income Risk and 
Correlation 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
    
  
  
Financial wealth (10E-6) (2) 6.046 (0.855) 6.098 (0.852) 6.142 (0.852) 
Financial wealth squared (10E-12) 
-1.788 (1.379) -1.798 (1.409) -1.846 (1.424) 
Income (10E-6) (3) 0.85 (0.462) 0.865 (0.474) 0.852 (0.474) 
Income squared (10E-12) 
-0.288 (0.246) -0.284 (0.252) -0.285 (0.254) 
Discrete income risk dummy 0.155 (0.092) - - 
Neg. Corr. between income risk and 
stock market risk (4) 0.323 (0.074) 0.324 (0.074) - 
Income risk (5) 
- 0.649 (1.243) - 
Income risk effect: 
   
For individuals with ρ ≥ 0 
 - - -2.963 (1.547) 
For individuals with ρ < 0 
 - - 1.519 (1.179) 
Working in a big firm 0.591 (0.091) 0.578 (0.091) 0.58 (0.091) 
Age (7) 0.121 (0.049) 0.124 (0.049) 0.123 (0.049) 
Age squared (10E-3) 
-1.319 (0.513) -1.343 (0.517) -1.33 (0.513) 
Inheritance 0.155 (0.089) 0.163 (0.089) 0.167 (0.089) 
Inter vivos transfers 0.111 (0.072) 0.112 (0.072) 0.111 (0.073) 
Paris 0.341 (0.099) 0.332 (0.099) 0.34 (0.099) 
Parents own risky assets 0.498 (0.084) 0.491 (0.084) 0.496 (0.084) 
Whether the individual answers the risk 
aversion question 0.873 (0.176) 0.859 (0.176) 0.871 (0.176) 
Absolute risk aversion 
-0.02 (0.004) -0.019 (0.004) -0.019 (0.004) 
Internet 0.308 (0.075) 0.31 (0.075) 0.312 (0.075) 
Woman 
-0.292 (0.113) -0.281 (0.114) -0.279 (0.114) 
House ownership 0.157 (0.083) 0.153 (0.083) 0.154 (0.083) 
Child (if children > 0) 
-0.087 (0.084) -0.09 (0.085) -0.08 (0.085) 
Liquidity constraints 
-0.334 (0.099) -0.31 (0.098) -0.316 (0.098) 
Constant 
-4.682 (1.15) -4.793 (1.168) -4.524 (1.159) 
Sigma (financial wealth) 1.652 (0.324) 1.678 (0.328) 1.692 (0.327) 
 
   
LR test of sigma=0 [distributed χ2(1)] 51.943 53.851 54.827 
Number of observations 2,406 2,406 2,406 
Source: ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’ survey and own calculations. Standard errors are in brackets. Absolute risk aversion 
takes value 0 for risk neutrals and 40 for the most risk averse. 
(1) Households who are risk lovers (with Zi > 5000) are dropped off the sample (54). 
(2) Household’s total financial wealth in French francs. 
(3) Household’s annual income in French francs. 
(4) The parameter ρ tries to measure the correlation between income risk and stock market risk. A different 
coefficient for income risk is computed depending on the sign of the correlation. See Appendix for details. 
(5) Income risk: standard deviation of expected income per unit of income estimated from “Patrimoine 98” using 
household characteristics of ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’. See the appendix and table A1 for details. Income in French 
francs. 
(6) Age: age of the head of the household. 
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Table A1: The Income Risk Estimation 
 Est. (s. e.) 
Variable mean 
(DELTA-TNS 
2002) 
Variable mean 
(Patrimoine 98) 
Ages 35-55 
Variable mean 
(Patrimoine 98) 
Whole sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income 0.044  (0.003) 201,847 201,860 169,611 
Age 
-389  (109) 45 45 50 
Age squared 2.365  (1.084) 2,093 2,064 2,733 
Health problems 3,004  (1,421) 5% 3% 3% 
Child (if n° of children > 0) 1,623  (813) 44% 85% 76% 
Post-graduate studies 1,348  (906) 7% 12% 11% 
Occupational status: 
    
Trader or craftsman 
-644  (1,761) 5% 8% 5% 
Profession 
-737  (1,642) 15% 22% 15% 
Foreman 
-1,493  (1,559) 27% 23% 15% 
Employee 
-3,059  (1,590) 16% 16% 12% 
Blue collar worker 
-3,070  (1,553) 27% 21% 15% 
Retired 
-4,044  (1,687) 6% 1% 29% 
Inactive 
-4,737  (1,802) 3% 3% 6% 
Personal Status: 
    
Cohabitation 2,331  (1,031) 10% 8% 9% 
Single 
-1,418  (995) 16% 16% 23% 
Divorced 
-2,099  (926) 10% 13% 9% 
Widow 441  (948) 2% 3% 10% 
Constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA):     
No answer 
-791  (780) 7% 11% 14% 
1 ≤ CRRA < 2 1,895  (583) 28% 36% 34% 
2 ≤ CRRA < 3.76 3,263  (869) 21% 11% 10% 
CRRA ≥ 3.76 2,423  (1,123) 8% 6% 5% 
Portfolio risk preference: 
    
Very small 
-307  (1,369) 47% 59% 63% 
Small 88  (1,440) 42% 34% 29% 
High 3,665  (1,791) 4% 5% 4% 
Probability to be unemployed in 
5 years:     
Very small 
-930  (961) 45% 43% 35% 
Small 764  (951) 26% 36% 36% 
High 1,937  (1,095) 6% 9% 13% 
Very high 1,637  (1,190) 3% 6% 8% 
Region: 
    
Paris Ile-de-France 
-1,712  (874) 18% 15% 17% 
Nord 
-835  (1,157) 7% 17% 7% 
East 
-961  (927) 10% 6% 13% 
West 
-1,540  (924) 14% 13% 14% 
Sud-West 
-13  (1,026) 11% 13% 9% 
Sud-East 
-2,010  (959) 11% 9% 12% 
Mediterranean 
-1,632  (923) 12% 13% 14% 
Constant 16,137  (3,506)    
          
Number of obs. 2,460 2,460 1,043 2,390 
Adj. R-sq 0.2603 
   
F(35,2355) 
Prob. > F 
25.03 
0.0001 
      
Source: ‘Patrimoine 98’ INSEE survey. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Reference values are: for occupational status "Agriculture", for  familiar status "Married", CRRA ≥ 3.76,  
for savings preferences and probability to be unemployed "Very high" and for region "Paris". 
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Table A2: Absolute Risk Aversion Estimation (1) 
Dependent variable  Ln Absolute risk aversion 
 
 
Ln financial wealth -0.021  (0.010) 
Paris -0.007  (0.042) 
Women 0.086  (0.042) 
Age 0.002  (0.002) 
Child (if children > 0) 0.076  (0.032) 
She has been unemployed -0.005  (0.028) 
Parents own risky assets -0.044  (0.035) 
Education level of head of the household: 
 
Primary or secondary level -0.094  (0.044) 
Baccalaureate -0.122  (0.052) 
Graduate studies -0.153  (0.054) 
Post-graduate studies -0.280  (0.088) 
Constant 3.699  (0.156) 
    
Adj. R-squared =  0.0148 No. of obs. =    2088 
F ( 10,  2077) =    3.84 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Source: ‘DELTA - TNS 2002’ survey and own calculations. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Absolute risk aversion takes value 0 for risk neutrals and 40 for the most risk averse. 
(1) Risk lovers are included in the OLS regression. 2088 out of 2460 answered the absolute risk  
aversion question. 
Note: The normality test of residuals has been rejected. Therefore bootstrapped standard errors 
are reported in brackets (based on 200 replications). No diploma is used as the reference group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
